The idyllic meadows of Baisaran Valley, near Pahalgam in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, became a scene of horror on April 22, 2025. Gunmen, clad in military-style uniforms and armed with M4 carbines and AK-47s, ambushed tourists enjoying the scenery. Methodically checking identities and religions, they opened fire, massacring at least 26 people – mostly Hindu tourists from India, plus one Nepali national – and wounding over twenty more. It was the deadliest attack on civilians in the disputed region in over two decades, eclipsing the 2019 Pulwama bombing targeting security forces.
Responsibility was swiftly claimed by The Resistance Front (TRF), a group widely identified by Indian officials and analysts as a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the notorious Pakistan-based terrorist organization with a long history of attacks against India. TRF linked the carnage to its opposition to the settlement of "non-locals" in Kashmir following India's 2019 revocation of Article 370, which had granted the region special autonomy.
The aftermath saw a precipitous spiral in tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. India, blaming Pakistan for facilitating cross-border terrorism, suspended its participation in the vital 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, closed the main Attari-Wagah border crossing, expelled Pakistani diplomats, reduced its own mission in Islamabad, and tightened visa rules. Reports of firing across the Line of Control (LoC) soon followed. Within India, outrage surged, leading to disturbing reprisals against Kashmiri Muslims elsewhere in the country.
The Pahalgam massacre, however, is more than an isolated tragedy. It stands as a stark, contemporary illustration of the violent, destabilizing fallout from Pakistan's long-standing state policy: the use of militant and terrorist groups as instruments of foreign policy. This strategy, embedded in Pakistan's strategic culture since 1947 and executed primarily by the powerful Army and its Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), aimed to counter perceived threats, mainly from India, and achieve objectives in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
Yet, decades of evidence demonstrate this reliance on non-state actors has comprehensively failed. Instead of enhancing security, it has bred devastating "blowback" terrorism internally, most notably from groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It has severely damaged relations with neighbours India and Afghanistan, and key powers like the US, while creating anxieties even for its closest ally, China. The policy has incurred significant economic costs, evidenced by stints on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list, and ultimately threatens Pakistan's own stability. The Pahalgam attack is the latest symptom of this chronic, self-destructive pathology. It underscores the urgent need for Pakistan to abandon the dangerous game of proxy warfare for genuine regional cooperation and a commitment to combating extremism for its own sake.
The nature of the Pahalgam attack offers clues. The deliberate targeting of Hindu tourists and the justification tied to post-Article 370 demographic changes suggest a calculated attempt to disrupt India's narrative of returning normalcy in Kashmir, deter tourism, and maximize political provocation. The use of TRF, assessed as an LeT front, follows a familiar pattern. LeT, internationally proscribed, likely uses fronts like TRF to maintain operational capability while providing plausible deniability for the Pakistani state and mitigating international pressure. This tactic mirrors past instances, suggesting a conscious strategy to navigate scrutiny while continuing violent operations.
Forging the Sword: Early Seeds of Militancy (1947-1979)
Pakistan's reliance on non-state actors traces back to its turbulent birth in 1947. Amidst the partition of British India, the fate of princely states like Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) – strategically located, Muslim-majority, ruled by a Hindu Maharaja – became fiercely contested.
Facing Maharaja Hari Singh's initial preference for independence and the potential accession to India, the nascent Pakistani state employed coercion. After diplomatic overtures failed, Pakistan applied economic pressure and fomented internal unrest in Poonch. This culminated in orchestrating a military invasion using irregular forces. On October 22, 1947, thousands of Pashtun tribal lashkars (militias) from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province were unleashed into J&K. Evidence points to direct state involvement, including logistical support from the Pakistan Army and participation of disguised regular soldiers. The objective: capture Srinagar and force Kashmir's accession to Pakistan.
The invasion, however, faltered. Reaching Baramulla, the tribal forces engaged in widespread looting, rape, and massacres of Hindus and Sikhs. This brutality stalled their advance and spurred the Maharaja to appeal to India, signing the Instrument of Accession on October 26-27, 1947. Indian troops airlifted to Srinagar halted the invaders, triggering the first Indo-Pakistani war. A UN ceasefire in 1949 left Kashmir divided by a Line of Control (LoC), a division enduring today.
The events of 1947-48 were foundational. The state-orchestrated tribal invasion, mere weeks after independence, revealed proxy warfare as a central pillar of Pakistan's security policy from the outset. Driven by insecurity, grievance over partition, and strategic asymmetry against a larger India, irregulars were seen as a low-cost tactic. This was a deliberate choice, setting a dangerous precedent.
Simultaneously, the proxies' horrific conduct in Baramulla highlighted the inherent risks: indiscipline undermining objectives, alienating locals, and providing India justification for intervention. This foreshadowed the recurring challenge of controlling non-state actors whose actions can spiral, damage the patron's interests, and generate lasting animosity.
The perceived partial success – securing part of Kashmir – reinforced the utility of irregular warfare within Pakistan's security establishment. The Army, feeling conventionally disadvantaged against India, increasingly saw proxies as force multipliers. The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), established post-independence, gradually became the prime instrument for managing covert operations, first in Kashmir, later expanding dramatically. This was underpinned by a national security narrative steeped in hostility towards India, solidified by partition trauma and later military defeats, driving a relentless quest for strategic parity that justified proxy use.
The Afghan Jihad and the Globalization of Proxy Warfare (1979-2001)
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 proved a watershed moment, dramatically escalating Pakistan's involvement in proxy warfare. For Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq's military rule, the invasion presented both threat and opportunity.
Positioned as a "frontline state," Pakistan became indispensable to the US, Saudi Arabia, and others backing the Afghan mujahideen resistance. This role brought legitimacy, massive funding, and advanced weaponry. The ISI took centre stage, channelling billions in covert aid and distributing arms (including US Stingers) to mujahideen factions based in Pakistan. Overseeing the training of some 80,000 fighters, the ISI gained enormous power and autonomy, embedding itself within transnational militancy structures.
Pakistan's choices were deliberate. Guided by security concerns about India and the disputed Durand Line border, the ISI preferentially supported hardline Islamist groups like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami. These groups were seen as ideologically aligned with Pakistan's vision for a post-Soviet Afghanistan: one providing "strategic depth" against India, resistant to Indian influence, and suppressing Pashtun nationalism. This selective support shaped the Afghan resistance, empowering Islamist factions. The decade saw a proliferation of militant camps, radical madrassas, and weapons within Pakistan, fostering a jihadist culture with lasting repercussions.
Following the Soviet withdrawal (1989) and Kabul's fall, Afghanistan plunged into civil war. When Hekmatyar failed to secure dominance, the ISI sought a more reliable partner to ensure a friendly, Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul. They turned to the Taliban, emerging from madrassas in southern Afghanistan and Pakistan.
From the mid-1990s, the ISI played a pivotal role in the Taliban's rapid ascent. Pakistan provided comprehensive political, financial, and military support, including hardware, logistics, advisors, and trainers. This was crucial to the Taliban capturing Kabul in 1996 and establishing their Islamic Emirate. Pakistan was one of only three nations to recognize the regime. Even under UN sanctions, Pakistan continued extensive supplies, including military hardware via daily truck convoys and infrastructure support.
Simultaneously, Pakistan maintained connections with Arab fighters and groups associated with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad who shared training facilities. This placed Pakistan at the epicenter of global jihadist movements.
The Afghan war's end created a pool of battle-hardened militants seeking new fronts. Pakistan's security establishment facilitated their redirection towards the Kashmir insurgency, which had surged in 1989. This influx intensified the conflict, shifting it towards religious extremism. Two major groups with alleged deep state ties emerged:
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): Founded in the late 1980s/early 1990s as the militant wing of an Islamist organization. Influenced by Wahhabism, it aimed to "liberate" Kashmir and establish Islamic rule across India. Heavily backed, trained, and funded by the ISI, it became a primary tool against India. LeT cadres, many from Pakistan and Afghanistan, infiltrated J&K around 1993, known for brutal attacks on civilians to foment communal strife.
- Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): Established in early 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar immediately after his release from Indian prison. Azhar, an Afghan jihad veteran linked to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, was freed in the IC 814 hijacking exchange (linked to Al-Qaeda). Upon return, Azhar was allegedly promoted by the ISI to lead JeM. Aiming to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, JeM drew members from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Arab veterans, initially sharing camps with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
The Soviet-Afghan war was transformative. It provided Pakistan resources and cover to massively expand proxy warfare capabilities. The ISI became deeply enmeshed with transnational militant networks. The infrastructure, fighters, and ideology cultivated for Afghanistan fueled the Kashmir insurgency. This solidified Islamist proxies as central to Pakistan's regional strategy. Furthermore, favouring specific Afghan factions (Hekmatyar, then Taliban) revealed a strategy beyond countering Soviets or India; it aimed to shape Afghanistan's internal politics to prevent Pashtun nationalism challenging Pakistani interests, particularly the Durand Line.
The Tightrope Walk: Pakistan's Post-9/11 Duality (2001-2021)
The September 11, 2001 attacks dramatically altered the global landscape, placing Pakistan in an extremely precarious position. The US demanded unequivocal support for its intervention in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban – the very regime Pakistan had nurtured.
Under intense pressure, President Pervez Musharraf aligned Pakistan with the US-led 'Global War on Terror'. Pakistan provided crucial logistical support, airspace access, intelligence sharing, and helped capture some Al-Qaeda operatives. This cooperation brought massive financial aid (over $32 billion by some estimates) and renewed international standing.
However, this public alignment masked a persistent covert strategy. Overwhelming evidence indicates elements within the Pakistani state, particularly the ISI, continued supporting the Afghan Taliban and allied Haqqani Network throughout the two-decade US/NATO presence. This included providing safe havens in Pakistan (Quetta, tribal areas), training (IEDs, suicide attacks), funding, munitions, and operational guidance. Reports suggested ISI representation on Taliban leadership councils, allowing monitoring and influence.
This "double game" stemmed from enduring strategic calculations: retaining influence in Afghanistan's future, hedging against Indian influence in Kabul, maintaining leverage over militants, and preserving assets for potential use against India or within Afghanistan. Pakistan's military establishment viewed the US intervention skeptically and sought to ensure its proxies survived.
While supporting Afghan militants, Pakistan faced pressure over groups targeting India. LeT and JeM were officially banned, especially after the 2001 Indian Parliament attack nearly sparked war. Yet, bans often proved superficial. Organizations operated openly, sometimes rebranding (LeT as Jamaat-ud-Dawa/JuD, JeM splintering). Leaders like Hafiz Saeed (LeT) and Masood Azhar (JeM) faced periodic detentions after major attacks but rarely lasting convictions, often citing lack of evidence.
This era saw devastating terror attacks on India traced back to Pakistan-based groups, repeatedly shattering dialogue attempts and causing dangerous escalations:
- Dec 2001 Indian Parliament Attack: Attributed to LeT/JeM, targeting India's democratic heart. Led to Operation Parakram, a year-long military standoff. US designated LeT/JeM as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
- Nov 2008 Mumbai Attacks: A multi-day siege by 10 LeT terrorists arriving from Karachi. Targeting high-profile locations, killing 166 (including foreigners). Caused global outrage, derailed India-Pakistan dialogue. Pakistan admitted partial planning on its soil but action against LeT leadership remained inadequate.
- Jan 2016 Pathankot & Sep 2016 Uri Attacks: JeM-linked attacks on Indian military bases. Uri prompted India's "surgical strikes" across the LoC, shifting its response doctrine. Talks stalled despite earlier positive signs.
- Feb 2019 Pulwama Attack: Suicide car bombing killing 40+ Indian paramilitary personnel; JeM claimed responsibility. India retaliated with unprecedented airstrikes deep inside Pakistan (Balakot). Led to aerial combat, capture of an Indian pilot – the most serious confrontation since 1999.
Simultaneously, Pakistan's support for the Afghan Taliban/Haqqani network destabilized Afghanistan, undermining US/NATO efforts. Attacks targeting Indian interests in Afghanistan (e.g., 2008 Embassy bombing) were also linked to Pakistani elements or proxies.
Persistent evidence of Pakistan's dual policy led to growing international frustration, especially from the US, as American lives were lost to insurgents backed by a supposed ally. This strained relations, leading to rebukes and significant cuts in US security assistance (approx. $2 billion frozen in 2018). The US designated key leaders like Masood Azhar as global terrorists. The relationship became transactional.
A major pressure point was the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In June 2018, Pakistan was placed back on the FATF "grey list" for strategic deficiencies in combating money laundering and terror financing (AML/CFT). This was directly linked to failures in prosecuting UN-designated terrorists (Saeed, LeT/JuD) and dismantling their financial networks. Grey-listing hindered access to international finance and investment. After four years and reforms, Pakistan was removed in Oct 2022, though monitoring continues.
The "double game" ultimately failed. Its contradictions were unsustainable. Temporary leverage gained through logistical support for the US eroded long-term trust. Repeated terror attacks forced India to abandon strategic restraint for a punitive posture. FATF imposed tangible costs. Diplomatic isolation, economic pressure, and heightened military risk exposed the flaws of relying on proxy warfare.
India's policy evolution – from diplomacy post-Mumbai to surgical strikes post-Uri and airstrikes post-Pulwama – signaled a progressively lower threshold for military retaliation. This willingness to escalate significantly raised potential costs for Pakistan, challenging the risk-reward calculus of its proxy strategy.
The Fire Within: Internal Consequences and Blowback (2007-Present)
While Pakistan pursued external objectives via proxies, the flames it fanned abroad ignited devastating fires within. Nurturing extremists, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), created fertile ground for blowback, manifesting most lethally as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Formally emerging in December 2007 under Baitullah Mehsud, the TTP united factions in the Pashtun tribal belt. While partly a reaction to Pakistani military operations post-9/11, its roots lay in the jihadist ecosystem Pakistan cultivated for Afghanistan and Kashmir. Many TTP fighters were veterans of these conflicts, sharing ideology and ties with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
The TTP's objectives directly challenged the Pakistani state: overthrow the government, impose harsh Sharia law, expel state influence from tribal regions, and establish an Islamic emirate. It fiercely opposed Pakistan's US alliance. Structurally a loose coalition, its strength has varied from several thousand core fighters to tens of thousands, with a significant post-2021 presence in Afghanistan.
From its inception, the TTP unleashed unprecedented violence against Pakistan, killing tens of thousands. Targets included military, police, government officials, politicians, infrastructure, minorities (Shias, Sufis), and civilians. Tactics were brutal: assassinations, ambushes, IEDs, military-style assaults, and frequent suicide attacks. Notorious incidents include the 2008 Islamabad Marriott bombing, 2009 attack on Sri Lankan cricketers, 2009 GHQ assault, 2011 Mehran naval base siege, and the horrific Dec 2014 Army Public School (APS) Peshawar massacre killing 149 (132 children). The TTP also targeted polio workers, attempted to assassinate Malala Yousafzai, and claimed responsibility for the failed 2010 Times Square bombing attempt.
Pakistan responded with large military offensives (Rah-e-Nijat 2009, Zarb-e-Azb 2014), dislodging the TTP from some strongholds and killing leaders (often via US drones), forcing many into Afghanistan. However, these operations failed to eliminate the group's capacity to regenerate.
The Afghan Taliban's return to power in August 2021 proved a major boon for the TTP. Ironically, despite Pakistan's decades of support, the new Kabul regime provides sanctuary and operational freedom to the TTP. Ideological and historical ties appear stronger than pressure from Islamabad. Consequently, Pakistan saw a dramatic resurgence in TTP attacks post-August 2021. After failed peace talks, the TTP ended its ceasefire in Nov 2022, intensifying attacks, particularly against security forces. A 2024 UN report suggests the TTP is Afghanistan's largest single terrorist group (6,000-6,500 fighters), potentially using abandoned Western weapons.
This created acute tensions between Islamabad and Kabul. Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of harboring the TTP and demands action. The Taliban deny responsibility, urge Pakistan to address its internal issues, and seem unwilling/unable to crack down, possibly fearing pushing TTP fighters towards ISKP. The impasse led to border skirmishes, recriminations, Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan, and the controversial late-2023 deportation of hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees by Pakistan – widely seen as pressure tactic over the TTP.
Beyond the TTP, Pakistan grapples with a long-simmering Baloch separatist insurgency in its resource-rich southwest. Groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) fight for autonomy or independence, fueled by grievances over marginalization, resource exploitation, and alleged rights abuses.
The multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of China's Belt and Road Initiative, added complexity. Many Baloch view CPEC, especially the Gwadar port development, as further external exploitation benefiting Punjab and China. Consequently, CPEC infrastructure and personnel (including Chinese nationals) became frequent targets. Dozens of Pakistani workers and several Chinese personnel have been killed. The presence of Islamist militants (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, ISKP) and reported tactical alliances between Baloch and Islamist groups further complicate security. Protecting CPEC across this volatile province requires tens of thousands of security personnel but persistent attacks endanger lives, deter investment, raise costs, and worry Beijing.
The TTP's emergence is the starkest example of blowback from Pakistan's policy of cultivating militants. The ideologies, networks, and safe havens fostered for external goals turned inward, attacking the state itself. Using tribal areas as sanctuaries weakened state control, allowing groups like TTP to flourish. The TTP's targeting of the state for perceived betrayals (e.g., post-9/11 US alliance) underscores the direct causal link. The scale of violence proves the catastrophic failure to contain the proxy strategy.
The post-2021 Afghanistan dynamic exposes the failure of "strategic depth". The assumption that a friendly Taliban regime would secure Pakistan's western flank proved false. The Afghan Taliban now provide sanctuary to the TTP, Pakistan's enemy, demonstrating how proxies develop independent agendas. Instead of depth, Pakistan faces heightened insecurity on its western border.
Finally, CPEC security challenges highlight how internal instability, partly a product of past policies, threatens vital economic interests. The convergence of Baloch grievances and militant presence strains security and creates friction with indispensable ally China. Internal consequences are now inextricably linked to international relationships and economic future.
 |
| Published by Aditya Basu - Grab Your Copy now! |
A State Isolated: Deteriorating Regional and Global Relationships
Decades of deploying militant proxies have not brought Pakistan security or advantage. Instead, this approach has systematically poisoned relationships, leading to deepening isolation and mistrust.
India: The relationship remains trapped in a cycle of hostility, primarily over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism. Groups like LeT and JeM, nurtured by Pakistan, consistently act as spoilers, undermining peace initiatives. The April 2025 Pahalgam attack triggered a severe downturn. India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), border closure, and diplomatic downgrades represent a significant hardening. Pakistan's retaliatory measures deepened the crisis. The IWT suspension is particularly grave; this 1960 treaty survived multiple wars. India's move signals potential willingness to leverage shared resources like water as a coercive tool, a step with potentially devastating consequences for Pakistan. This reflects profound frustration and a search for impactful pressure points beyond conventional responses. India's policy under Modi shows departure from "strategic restraint," with overt military retaliation post-Uri (2016) and Pulwama (2019) setting precedents. Post-Pahalgam vows reinforce this robust posture. This escalatory dynamic, fueled by Pakistan's failure to curb proxies, leaves little room for engagement and renders regional bodies like SAARC defunct.
Afghanistan: The pursuit of "strategic depth" via installing a friendly regime has demonstrably backfired post-Taliban return in 2021. The assumption of a pliable ally proved flawed. Pakistan now faces a neighbour providing safe haven to the TTP, which attacks the Pakistani state. The Afghan Taliban prioritize ties with the TTP over Islamabad's demands. This results in deteriorating relations: border clashes, Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan, recriminations, trade disruptions, and the mass deportation of Afghan refugees exacerbating tensions.
United States: Once a major alliance, the US-Pakistan relationship is severely damaged by divergent interests and mistrust. Pakistan's "double game" in Afghanistan – aiding the US against Al-Qaeda while supporting the Taliban insurgency – inflicted irreparable harm. Nuclear program concerns also persist. With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan's perceived geostrategic importance diminished. The relationship is now more "normalized" or transactional, focused on limited mutual interests: counter-terrorism, nuclear safety, regional stability, democracy promotion. Broad strategic alignment is absent, aid is lower, and the relationship is shadowed by past grievances. While military ties persist, Washington largely views Pakistan's internal challenges as self-inflicted, retaining targeted sanctions but hesitant to apply broad pressure that could destabilize the nuclear state.
China: China remains Pakistan's steadfast "all-weather friend," anchored by shared geopolitical interests and massive CPEC investments. However, persistent security threats to CPEC projects, especially in Balochistan, strain this partnership. Repeated attacks targeting infrastructure and Chinese nationals cause alarm in Beijing, which views CPEC as a flagship BRI component. China has reportedly increased pressure on Islamabad to enhance security and counter militant threats, potentially involving closer intelligence sharing or even Chinese private security contractors. Despite massive Pakistani troop deployment for CPEC security, ongoing attacks highlight limitations. Failure to guarantee CPEC security could undermine Chinese confidence and jeopardize the vital corridor, creating unprecedented friction.
In essence, Pakistan's reliance on proxies has paradoxically led to growing isolation. Pursuing leverage against India via terrorism foreclosed normalization and invited costly retaliation. Investing in the Afghan Taliban yielded hostility, not strategic depth. Duplicity during the War on Terror shattered US trust. Internal instability now threatens the crucial China partnership. Each key relationship suffers from the consequences of Pakistan's entanglement with non-state violence.
Dousing the Flames: The Imperative for a New Strategy
Pakistan's seven-decade reliance on militant proxies demands critical reassessment. Accumulated evidence points to a strategy that has failed objectives and actively undermined Pakistan's stability, prosperity, and standing. Continuing this path risks catastrophe; a fundamental strategic shift is imperative.
Critique of the Existing "Terror Philosophy":
- Failure to Achieve Objectives: Decades of supporting militancy haven't altered Kashmir's status quo or won international support. Proxy investment in Afghanistan yielded a volatile border, not "strategic depth".
- Devastating Self-Inflicted Wounds: Internal blowback (TTP) killed tens of thousands, destabilized regions, drained resources, deterred investment, and exacerbated fault lines. Economic costs (FATF grey-listing) were severe. The policy distorted state institutions, empowering the military/ISI over civilian governance.
- Erosion of International Standing: Pakistan is widely perceived as tolerating or sponsoring terrorism, damaging diplomacy, hindering investment/aid, and causing isolation.
- Unsustainable Calculus: Short-term tactical gains are overwhelmed by long-term strategic costs: human toll, economic damage, isolation, internal fragmentation, escalation risks.
Pathways to Regional Harmony:
- Addressing the Root Cause: An unambiguous, irreversible renunciation of proxies is foundational. Requires verifiable dismantling of terrorist infrastructure (camps, finance, networks) and severing state links (ISI/military).
- Dialogue with India: Create conditions for sustained dialogue, including credible action against anti-India groups and justice for past attacks (Mumbai, Pathankot).
- Cooperative Approach with Afghanistan: Shift from manipulation to mutual respect, non-interference, genuine CT cooperation (TTP, ISKP), collaborative border management, humane refugee solutions.
Domestic Reforms:
- Rebalancing Civil-Military Relations: Strengthen civilian democratic institutions and parliamentary oversight of military/intelligence budgets and operations.
- Comprehensive Counter-Extremism: Long-term strategies: education reform (countering radical narratives), promoting tolerance, economic opportunities, addressing grievances (Balochistan, ex-FATA).
- Strengthening Rule of Law: Robust investigation/prosecution of terrorists and financiers, ending temporary arrests cycle, ensuring accountability. Consistent AML/CFT implementation to avoid FATF scrutiny.
Fundamental change requires more than superficial adjustments; it needs a profound shift in strategic culture, especially within the military/intelligence establishment. Moving away from the India-centric threat perception that justifies asymmetric warfare, recognizing security lies in internal stability and regional cooperation, not perpetual proxy conflict. Past crackdowns were often temporary/selective; civilian governments lacked power to alter the military's course. Lasting change demands re-evaluating core security assumptions and rebalancing state power.
What Can Be Done to Stabilise the Region:
- For Pakistan: Issue clear policy renouncing proxies; verifiably dismantle terror infrastructure; prosecute UN-designated terrorists (Saeed, Azhar); sustain AML/CFT compliance; engage India unconditionally with security guarantees; cooperate with Afghanistan on CT/border/refugee issues; strengthen civilian oversight of military/ISI; promote inclusive development in marginalized regions.
- For International Community: Maintain consistent pressure demanding Pakistan abandon proxies (diplomacy, economic leverage, targeted sanctions); offer conditional support for reforms tied to verifiable progress; facilitate India-Pakistan dialogue and regional CT cooperation; support Afghanistan stabilization efforts; encourage equitable CPEC benefits distribution to address local grievances. Calibrate pressure carefully: excessive isolation could destabilize, insufficient pressure allows status quo. A coordinated approach with incentives/disincentives tied to verifiable actions offers the best path.
Choosing Peace Over Perpetual Conflict
Pakistan's history since 1947 is inextricably tied to its use of militant proxies. Born from partition's insecurities and fueled by strategic competition, particularly with India, the state cultivated and deployed proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan. This report traced this strategy's evolution: from 1947 Kashmir invasion, through Afghan jihad expansion, nurturing the Taliban and anti-India groups (LeT/JeM), to the post-9/11 "double game".
The evidence overwhelmingly shows this policy's catastrophic failure. It hasn't delivered victory in Kashmir or lasting influence in Afghanistan. Instead, it unleashed devastating blowback terrorism (TTP) internally, costing tens of thousands of Pakistani lives. It poisoned relations with India, leading to recurrent crises and dangerous escalation. It turned Afghanistan into a source of insecurity, not "strategic depth". It eroded US trust and strained ties even with ally China over CPEC threats. It incurred significant economic costs and damaged Pakistan's reputation, trapping it in violence, instability, and isolation.
The April 2025 Pahalgam attack is the latest grim testament to this policy's enduring, destructive legacy. Pakistan stands at a critical crossroads. Continuing proxy warfare courts further fragmentation, hardship, conflict, and potential state failure.
The alternative demands profound, courageous strategic reorientation: a definitive break with the "terror philosophy". This requires dismantling militant infrastructure, ensuring accountability, and committing unequivocally to peaceful coexistence. It demands prioritizing internal stability, strengthening democracy, investing in the populace, and pursuing genuine dialogue with neighbours India and Afghanistan.
Embracing regional harmony, diplomacy, and domestic development isn't weakness; it's the only rational path to genuine security and prosperity. The cost of playing with fire is intolerably high. For its own future and regional stability, Pakistan must choose a different course, before the state itself is consumed by the flames it helped ignite.
Reference:
- Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity - The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War
- The Sun in the Sky: The relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan insurgents
- Islamist Militancy in Pakistan
- Conflict Between India and Pakistan
- Unraveling Deception: Pakistan's Dilemma After Decades of Promoting Militancy in Afghanistan and the Region
- The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba
- Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)
- Jaish-e-Mohammed - Wikipedia
- Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) - NCTC FTO
- Pakistan: Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including origin, mandate, organizational structure, membership, recruitment, activities, funding, and presence in Karachi; state response (2011-June 2014)
- Security of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): Counterinsurgency in Balochistan
- CPEC's success hinges on peace in Balochistan
- From Allies To Enemies: Relations Between Afghan Taliban And Pakistan Hit Rock Bottom
- The Decades-Long “Double-Double Game”, Pakistan, the United States, and the Taliban
- Indo-Pakistani war of 1947–1948 - Wikipedia
Content Code: AHI
Article Editor: Aditya Basu
Creative Commons: N/A
 |
| Published by Aditya Basu - Grab Your Copy now! |
 |
 |
 |
|
The Creationz Collection by Aditya Basu
|
||
BLOG TAGS |
||
.jpg)
